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In this paper, I outline a groundwork for a media theory of machine learning by 
introducing two new concepts, compute-computing and compute-computed, and a 
framework for their interaction.[1] Compute-computing (computing as generative) is 
here understood as the “active” learning component of a system, whereas compute-
computed (computing as generated) is understood as the “passive”, coded, 
imprinted or inscribed aspect of a system. I introduce these two concepts to help us 
to think through the specificity of algorithmic systems that are more than just the 
operative, sequential or parallel systems of computational processing to which we 
have become accustomed. Indeed, in the case of machine learning systems, these 
systems have the capacity to be self-positing in the sense of generating models and 
data structures that internalise certain pattern characteristics of data, without the 
requirement that they are translated into formal data structures by a human 
programmer.[2] That is, they are able to capture the abstract form of data input into 
the system, identify key characteristics, frames or patterns, and store this for 
comparison and classification of other data streams or objects. 
 
In a sense, these systems could be said to have an additional agency which is the 
ability to create new algorithms, as compute-computing; that is, that they can 
construct a model of a “world” of data and functions to transform them. Due to 
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limitations of space, I can only give the broad outlines of the theoretical and 
conceptual work that needs to be undertaken to think through this new computational 
form and its implications. Nonetheless, I do want to point towards the possible future 
directions for thinking about machine learning that this preliminary work suggests. 
Consequently, in this paper I am forced to bracket out the broader societal and 
political economic implications – which are of course, substantial and estimated at 
$26-39 billion in investment in machine learning in 2016 alone (Bughin et al., 2017) – 
in order to concentrate on a new framework for thinking about machine learning, but 
also as a contribution towards critiquing it. In particular, I want to think about 
machine learning in terms of its capacity for self-writing, or automatic model-building, 
and the problematics for thinking about the complexity of code, software and 
algorithms when the “code” is, in some sense, wrapped again inside another level of 
complexity. Machine learning appears as a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 
enigma”, particularly to those outside the field, and this morphology of obscurity and 
complexity requires theoretical and empirical unpacking.[3]By presenting a different 
conceptual model for thinking about machine learning, we can begin the critical work 
of understanding what is happening beneath the surface of these new computational 
forms and how their deployment matters. 
 
The difficulty of researching algorithms and software have been the focus of a 
number of scholarly works (for example: Berry, 2011; Berry and Fagerjord, 2017; 
Chun, 2006; 2010; 2011; Fuller, 2008; Manovich, 2001; Marino, 2006; Wardrip-Fruin, 
2009) but here, by concentrating on machine learning as a specific problematic in 
relation to software more generally, I want to pull attention towards the particular 
issues for a media theory of machine learning. There are already some useful 
examples of scholarly work that are thinking about machine learning, but these are 
usually overly general (Alpaydin, 2016; Domingos, 2017), focused on issues of 
black-boxing or technical classification (see Burrell, 2016; Domingos, 2012) or are 
popular texts concerned with broader themes (Carr, 2016; Ford, 2016; Kelly, 2017; 
McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2017). In contrast, here I develop what we might call a 
theoretical and philosophical prolegomenon for a new set of concepts for thinking 
about machine learning structures and processes. 
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In the first section, I want to look at the specificity of machine learning in relation to 
the larger field of artificial intelligence research. In the second section, I introduce my 
conceptual framework and explain how it is linked to the work of Baruch Spinoza. 
Finally, in the last section, I explore how this conceptual framework provides a 
means for discussing machine learning in relation to problematics raised for media 
theory, digital humanities and social theory more generally. As previously noted, this 
paper, by virtue of its restricted length, will be limited in offering a broad overview of 
very complex subjects; nonetheless, it is hoped that this helps to concentrate the 
discussion around the theoretical concepts I want to outline. [4] 
  
1. 
 
In 1959, Arthur Samuel is claimed by many who work in the area to have defined 
machine learning as a “field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without 
being explicitly programmed”. I say claimed, because although widely cited in the 
literature to Samuel’s work (1959), the phrase does not actually appear in his article. 
Nonetheless, this definition is an accepted (and repeated) origin point in the field and 
often used to show how machine learning is particularly geared towards the self-
learning capacity of a machine and how it differs from artificial intelligence, that is, 
the application of computation to symbolic tasks that are usually undertaken through 
human cognition.[5] In 1997, Mitchell updated this definition to describe machine 
learning as “a computer program [that] is said to learn from experience E with 
respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at 
tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experience E” (Mitchell, 1997). In 
essence, he argues that it is the performance indicator that is crucial for the 
development of the “learning” capacity, that is the ability to undertake the processing 
work within a shorter period of time. We can only note here that this notion of 
“learning” is very specific and technical in its deployment, and relates to the ability to 
undertake skills or tasks, not to wider humanistic connotations of learning as 
understanding, interpretation, etc. Indeed, it is this focus on specific domain 
 4 
problems that is said to delimit machine learning in relation to the wider knowledge 
problems of general artificial intelligence. 
 
Machine learning as a specific area of artificial intelligence research has received a 
great deal of interest, not only from academic researchers and corporations, but also 
in terms of the public sphere through the media since 2010 (see Donnelly, 
2017; Economist, 2017; Lewis-Kraus, 2016; Tufekci, 2014). Partly, this has been due 
to changes in hardware and software capacities that enable some of the promises of 
artificial intelligence to be realised across the entire landscape of media ecology. The 
turn to machine learning has also been driven by the limited capacities within 
disciplines to cope with an ever-growing mountain of digital data, so-called Big Data, 
combined with a political economy that sees huge economic potential in mining this 
data for insights and profit. As Burrell explains, “machine learning algorithms are 
used as powerful generalizers and predictors. Since the accuracy of these 
algorithms is known to improve with greater quantities of data to train on, the growing 
availability of such data in recent years has brought renewed interest to these 
algorithms” (Burrell, 2016: 5). It is certainly the case that machine learning is finding 
its way into a myriad of devices, from cloud computing centres, to translation 
services, televisions, phones and talking assistants. Indeed, the deployment of 
machine learning has increasingly begun to resemble other kinds of computational 
services, with a notional layering of abstractions available as code libraries and 
application programming interfaces (APIs), and also as services available from third 
parties. 
 
To create systems in this way is to already begin to reveal the depth model that is 
implicit in computational layers, often wrapped inside each other. Whilst the notion of 
layering in computational systems is very common (see Berry, 2014: 58; Kitchin, 
2016: 20), this is also very much the logic of producing a “black box” that can handle 
machine learning processing with a simplified interface for inputs and outputs (Berry, 
2011: 15-16). However, if we move away from the external perspective on machine 
learning and focus on its internal system structure, here it is interesting to observe 
the way in which machine learning is structured rather like an onion, with the outside 
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layers, usually programmed in a conventional computer programming language, 
creating an internal software machine that constructs abstractions of data that can 
be created, linked, programmed and weighted in a number of important ways. 
Machine learning algorithms have three main aspects which need to be implemented 
in the development of machine learning systems. These are: (1) Knowledge 
Representation: Machine learning algorithms implement a model of knowledge, 
using knowledge representations such as decision trees, sets of rules, instances, 
graphical models, neural networks, support vector machines, or model ensembles; 
(2) Evaluation: Machine learning systems are trained to become classifying systems 
using inductive learning techniques, and are evaluated through techniques such as 
accuracy, prediction and recall, squared error, likelihood, posterior probability, cost, 
margin, and entropy k-L divergence; and (3) Optimisation: the algorithms are 
optimized using techniques such as combinatorial optimization, convex optimization, 
and constrained optimization. 
 
Most machine learning systems use a model of inductive cognition to produce 
classifications. Here, induction is understood as “the process of inferring general 
rules from specific data” (Mooney, 2000: 1). Machine learning can be organised 
using supervised learning with training data, unsupervised learning with clustering 
techniques, semi-supervised learning with a smaller amount of training data, or 
through reinforcement learning, whereby feedback into the network reinforces 
internal structures based on the success of its output. In all cases, the aim is that the 
system learns to create the function that transforms the input data into an output, to 
create so called local generalisation as opposed to abstract generalisation. The 
output can take the form of classificatory systems, where the function creates 
discrete outputs, regression systems, where the function is continuous, 
and probability estimation systems, where the output is a probability value. 
For example, where the knowledge representation is a neural network, a 
“connectionist” system is constructed. In the case of neural networks, a different 
paradigm for computing is introduced based on processing/memory abstraction that 
is inspired by the “parallel architecture of animal brains”. The neural net systems 
work by taking a given input A and translating it into B through intermediate, 
 6 
sometimes called hidden, layers of neural nets. Traditional computational systems 
are usually procedural (or imperative); a program starts at the first line of code, 
executes it, and goes on to the next, following instructions in a somewhat linear 
fashion.[6] A true neural network does not necessarily follow a linear path. Rather, 
information is processed collectively, in parallel throughout a network of nodes (the 
nodes, in this case, being neurons, or small program units connected together with 
weights between them). By using techniques such as feed-forward (i.e. no loops in 
processing) and back-propagation (allowing the output to be weighted back into the 
network to correct anomalies), these systems can become better at pattern 
recognition and classification. 
 
The actual internals to the functioning of machine learning might be thought of as 
analogous to the notion of “sandboxing”, whereby the machine learning model is 
contained within another structure of code. Sandboxing is a technique used in 
computing to separate application code into differing levels of access and control so 
that different security levels can be applied and only the appropriate level of access 
is granted to the application. The key aim is to prevent unauthorised access to 
computer resources, but it can also be used to normalise the computational 
architecture so that the same code can run on different systems, as was done with 
the Java language, for example. In the case of neural nets, it is not computer 
security that is the issue as such; rather, it is the creation of an abstract machine that 
models in software the operation of a simplified notion of neural cells, and which can 
encode and store a functional transformation within a network data structure. With 
machine learning, one could say that a different form of “sandboxing” is being 
undertaken, whereby the “learning” or “training” processes are required to generate 
an algorithmic model embedded in an abstract machine. This in turn is constructed 
from software neural networks to generate a function for analysing data inputs and 
computed outputs (whether classification, regression or probabilistic). This structure 
allows the network to learn to identify similarities, and as such move from the training 
data to completely novel data that it can pattern match based on the training data it 
has seen before. Thus the “fundamental goal of machine learning is to generalize 
beyond the examples in the training set” (Domingos, 2012). That is, machine 
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learning is essentially an inductive process based on the original empirical training 
data fed into the network inputs and carefully reinforced so that the network pattern 
matching achieves the desired aims. 
These systems have a broad range of uses, but some include: pattern recognition, 
with examples such as facial recognition, optical character recognition, etc.; time 
series prediction, so that machine learning can be used to make predictions; signal 
processing, so that machine learning can be trained to process an audio signal and 
filter it appropriately; control, so that machine learning can be used to manage 
steering decisions of physical vehicles; soft sensors, so that analysing a collection of 
many measurements can be abstracted into one machine learning algorithm by 
processing input data from many individual sensors and evaluate them as a whole; 
and lastly for anomaly detection, so that the machine learns to recognize patterns, 
and can also be trained to raise an alert when something is anomalous. These 
various use cases have endeared machine learning to a number of real-world 
systems, from financial marketing forecasting, fraud detection and identification 
systems to anti-terrorism surveillance. 
  
2 
Now I want to change register and turn to conceptualising the underlying structure in 
machine learning, by briefly thinking through the work of the philosopher, Baruch 
Spinoza (1632-1677).[7] Whilst there is not sufficient space to give a deep outline of 
Spinoza’s philosophy, what I want to bring forward is his development of the 
medieval notion of Natura naturans (Nature naturing), particularly in relation to 
Spinoza’s notions of Natura naturans and Natura naturata. The notions of Natura 
naturans and Natura naturata can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy and 
through Augustine and Scotus Eriugena as a distinction between between God and 
world. Spinoza uses these concepts but with the intention to introduce a distinction 
between the part of nature that he argues is generative, and related to a traditional 
notion of a creator God, that is Natura naturans, and the part of nature that is the 
result of an act of creation, Natura naturata (see Demasio, 2003: 329). Thus, for 
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Spinoza there are two sides of Nature. There is the active, productive aspect of the 
universe – what Spinoza calls Substance and its attributes, and from which all else is 
derived and which Spinoza calls Natura naturans – ‘naturing Nature’. There is also 
the other aspect of the universe is that which is produced and sustained by this 
active aspect, which Spinoza calls Natura naturata, or ‘natured Nature’ (see Nadler 
2001: 100). 
 
Spinoza uses these terms in Ethics (1, xxix) where he explains that “by Natura 
naturans we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such 
attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is … God, 
insofar as he is considered as a free cause.” That is, that Natura naturans is 
productive of an objective Natura naturata. In other words, there is “causal and 
epistemic dependence of all things upon God” (as Natura naturans) (Nadler, 2001: 
100). Whereas he argued that “by Natura naturata I understand whatever follows 
from the necessity of God’s nature, or from God’s attributes, that is, all the modes of 
God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and can 
neither be nor be conceived without God.” So, Natura naturans has traditionally 
designated God, insofar as he is understood as the creator and principle of all action, 
while Natura naturans is understood as the totality of beings and laws he has 
created (see Hadot, 1995: 262). This construction, as Hadot notes, has had a lot of 
interest from artists for conceptualising their practice, such as Klee who argued that 
“Natura naturans is more important to the painter than Natura naturata” (Hadot, 
1995: 255). So, Spinoza understands Natura naturans as ‘Nature’ – a creative 
potency-in-act as God. This is Nature creating itself, nature as “naturing itself”. In 
contrast, he argues, Natura naturata is a determinate totality of determinate being, it 
having received a form – that is, nature ‘natured’. 
  
3 
This distinction can be understood as being of a constitutive (Natura naturans) and 
an operational (Natura naturata) form and it is this constitutive and operative 
distinction that I want to argue is helpful for thinking through machine learning. To 
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this I want to introduce these two new concepts. (1) Compute-computing, understood 
as a generating level of activity in the machine learning system, which can be 
understood as “active” and analogous to Spinoza’s notion of Natura naturans, in as 
much as it creates the conditions for the neural network. That is, it forms a 
constitutional level in the computational structure which creates the conditions of 
possibility for the network as such. This is in operation mostly in the training or 
learning phase of the machine learning system. This is analogous to what Spinoza 
understands as the constitutional structure and patterns, what he calls the 
“attributes” of Natura naturans. And the second concept of (2) compute-computed, 
understood as that which is or has been generated and as such is “passive”, as in 
Spinoza’s notion of Natura naturata. This forms the operational level of the machine 
learning system, what Spinoza understands as the operational “modes” of Natura 
naturata. So here, passive does not mean inactive; rather it points to the 
performative aspect of the compute-computed, that which has been produced and 
which can be made operative in relation to the function of pattern matching by the 
network. This, then, is the network following training with data, and which cannot, of 
itself, produce another network. With the notion of Natura naturans, Spinoza and 
other philosophers pointed towards the fecundity of Nature (and by extension God) 
in its creative, dynamic capacity. Similarly, here I want to point to the creative 
potentiality offered by compute-computing for generating multiple modes of compute-
computed. 
 
We might note that there are a number of different machine learning algorithms. We 
can think of these as multiple attributes of compute-computing. Examples include 
decision tree learning, association rule learning, artificial neural networks, deep 
learning, inductive logic programming, support vector machines, clustering, Bayesian 
networks, reinforcement learning, representation learning, similarity and metric 
learning, sparse dictionary learning, genetic algorithms, rule-based machine 
learning, and learning classifier systems. Broadly speaking these algorithms are 
generative and allow a machine to learn using a learning data set so that it can work 
with new, unseen data. The idea is that through the learning process the algorithm is 
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able to create a compute-computed which enables some form of prediction or 
pattern-matching related to new presented data.[8] 
Now I want to change register again and think more broadly about the wider use of 
machine learning techniques in examples which will be more familiar. I will briefly 
introduce deep learning algorithms, particularly those which use convolutional neural 
networks (CNNs). I focus on these because CNNs have application in natural 
language processing but also in image and video recognition and, therefore, 
applicability in relation to digital humanities projects.[9]  The wider public are 
becoming familiar with the generative capacities of so-called deep convolutional 
networks, such as DeepDream, due to its appeal to popular culture in the generation 
of seemingly hallucinated images that are dreamlike in form. DeepDream is a system 
created by Google using a CNN to find and enhance patterns in images via 
algorithmic pareidolia. The software is designed to detect faces and other patterns in 
images, with the aim of automatically classifying images. However, once trained, the 
network can also be run in reverse, being asked to adjust the original image slightly 
so that a given compute-computed (e.g. the image for faces or certain animals) is 
placed back in the original image. 
 
CNNs work by modelling animal visual perception, and can therefore be applied to 
visual recognition automation. They are made up of multiple layers of individual 
software sensory neurons (so-called receptive fields, which are made up of clusters 
of these neurons). The word “convolution” comes from its use to describe a 
mathematical operation on two functions which produces a third function. The new 
function is a modified version of one of the original functions. For image analysis, 
convolutional filtering plays an important role in many important algorithms; for 
example, in edge detection, sharpening an image and adding blurring. Convolutional 
neural networks cascade convolution functions to create high-definition and detailed 
image analysis. They can also be used to identify and analyse textual inputs, and 
can recognise different letter forms, typefaces, characters, etc. and generate 
visualisations based on these contents. One example of their use in a digital 
humanities project is in Patricia Fumerton’s work (UCSB) in the English Broadside 
Ballad Archive.[10] Here, CNNs are used to process and classify woodblock images 
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and text automatically. The use of machine learning creates a pattern library for 
finding like woodblocks but also opens up the possibility of discovery of new links 
between the woodblocks. 
 
Another example of these systems is recurrent neural network (RNN), a class of 
artificial neural network where connections between networks form a directed cycle. 
Unlike feedforward neural networks, RNNs can use their internal memory to process 
arbitrary sequences of inputs. This makes them applicable to tasks such as 
unsegmented connected handwriting recognition or speech recognition. One such 
RNN, long short-term memory (LSTM), is a recurrent network that excels at 
remembering values for either long or short durations of time. Indeed, it is for these 
reasons that they are used by Google for speech recognition on the smartphone, for 
the smart assistant Allo, and for Google Translate. Apple also uses LSTM machine 
learning for the “Quicktype” function on the iPhone and for Siri, and Amazon similarly 
uses LSTM for Amazon Alexa. These machine learning supported systems are very 
much becoming more evident in everyday life, and I hope that, by showing these 
links between what seem like complex and esoteric paradigms in computing and 
their growing importance as elements of mediation and experience in everyday use 
of phones, computers and technology, we can see the urgency for media theoretical 
work in this area. 
This short paper can only give a very brief introduction to these questions and to the 
theoretical work I am developing in this area. With machine learning we have the 
broad outlines of a new computational paradigm which is likely to have a major 
impact on the kinds of media systems the public uses over the next decade or so. As 
I have outlined in this paper, this is a complex technical field but needs to be 
addressed urgently. I have sought to rethink the technical issues at play by 
rearticulating their major contours through Spinoza’s concepts of Natura 
naturans and Natura naturata to develop the analogous concepts of compute-
computing and compute-computed. These bring to the fore the major advances for 
thinking about computation in terms of its generative and pattern-matching capacities 
in recent technical work. This paper has only given broad outlines and examples of 
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this new and rapidly growing field and much work remains to be done. Indeed, if we 
have only just started asking questions about the medium specificity of algorithms 
and software, then it is clear that the added complexity of machine learning is going 
to challenge media theory into engaging with new forms of computation which have 
important consequences for human attention, reading, learning, and instrumentality 
more widely. 
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Notes 
[1] There are also interesting resonances of Heidegger’s notion of things thinging. 
[2] Many of these machine learning systems still require handcrafting by “engineer-
artisans” who are required to optimise the networks internal to these systems. 
[3] Winston Churchill in a radio broadcast in October 1939 declared, “I cannot 
forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” 
[4] Journals that engage with theoretical and philosophical concepts and ideas, such 
as Media Theory, are important sites for the exploration and explication of what we 
might call theory-work, and as such crucial to the development of the field of media 
philosophy. 
[5] This definition is contested, of course, and many scholars and practitioners think 
of machine learning as a subset of the wider field of artificial intelligence. The 
term artificial intelligence itself was coined in 1956 at Dartmouth College at the 
Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence by John McCarthy, 
then an Assistant Professor of Mathematics. 
[6] Object oriented programming and related approaches extend these techniques 
but continue to require human understanding and programming of its linear 
operation, albeit in this case distributed over a system of software objects. 
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[7] It might be noted that there is an interesting tension in using the work of a 
rationalist such as Spinoza for thinking through the empiricism of machine learning, 
particularly in light of the emphasis placed on the inductive model of reasoning 
machine learning relies upon. In this paper, there isn’t space to develop this issue 
and think through the tension in any depth, but I look to engage with this question in 
a later paper. Many thanks for the discussion by participants at the 
Visualisierungsprozesse in den Humanities conference which took place in Zürich, 
Switzerland, from 17-19 July 2017, where this issue and others were raised. 
[8] An important area for digital humanities is that of topic modelling, which gives a 
good example of this distinction between the constitutive (compute-computing) and 
the operative (compute-computed) in its use and deployment. Both the discriminative 
and generative machine learning forms of topic modelling can be helpfully 
understood using these concepts. 
[9] There are also a number of open source projects available to use off-the-shelf: 
Caffe, DeepLearning4j, DeepLearning-hs, neon, TensorFlow, Theano, and Torch. 
[10] English Broadside Ballad Archive: http://ebba.english.ucsb.edu 
  
 
 
